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The past two decades have brought revolutionary changes in global health, driven by popular concern over the acquired immunodefi-ciency syndrome (AIDS), new strains of influenza, and maternal mortality.1 
International development assistance for health — a crucial aspect of health coop-
eration — increased by a factor of five, from $5.6 billion in 1990 to $28.1 billion in 
2012, with the private and voluntary sectors taking on an ever-increasing share of 
the total.2 Given the rapid globalization that is a defining feature of today’s world, 
the need for a robust system of global health law has never been greater.
Global health law is not an organized legal system, with a unified treaty-
monitoring body, such as the World Trade Organization. However, there is a net-
work of treaties and so-called “soft” law instruments that powerfully affect global 
health, many of which have arisen under the auspices of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO). Global health law has been defined as the legal norms, pro-
cesses, and institutions that are designed primarily to attain the highest possible 
standard of physical and mental health for the world’s population.3
Global health law can affect multiple spheres, ranging from national security, 
economic prosperity, and sustainable development to human rights and social 
justice. Each global health problem is shaped by the language of rights, duties, and 
rules for engagement used in the law (see Glossary).
Under s ta nding the L aw a nd Gl ob a l He a lth
Safeguarding the population’s health traditionally occurs at the national level, with 
a web of laws and regulations governing health services, injury and disease preven-
tion, and health promotion.4 However, in a globalized world in which pathogens 
and lifestyle risks span borders, the need for collective action has intensified inter-
est in international legal solutions.5
The law relating to global health rests primarily within the domain of public 
international law, which can be broadly characterized as the rules that govern the 
conduct and relations of countries, including their rights and obligations. Coun-
tries remain the major subjects of international law, but international organiza-
tions and (through human rights law) individuals are also considered to be sub-
jects of international law.
There is a complex array of international norms, including those that are bind-
ing, or “hard” (e.g., treaties), and those that are nonbinding, or “soft” (e.g., codes 
of practice). Hard and soft legal instruments have many similarities and often take 
similar forms, since both forms of instruments are negotiated and adopted by 
countries, are administered by international organizations, and have similar com-
pliance mechanisms, such as setting targets, monitoring progress, and reporting 
to governmental agencies. Soft instruments can influence domestic law and policy 
and are often viewed as part of the corpus of international law (Fig. 1; and the 
interactive timeline, available at NEJM.org).6
An interactive 
timeline 
is available 
at NEJM.org 
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In recent years, the international community 
has moved toward a new language of global 
governance.7 Neither global health law nor gov-
ernance is well defined, but the central feature 
of global health law is the negotiation, adoption, 
and monitoring of normative rules among coun-
tries. Both law and broader governance require 
institutions to do much of the work, including 
creating norms, mobilizing resources, guiding 
multiple stakeholders to work collaboratively, and 
ensuring accountability for results. The WHO is 
the most important institution for negotiating 
international health agreements.8
W HO a s a  Nor m ati v e Agenc y
The WHO has constitutional authority to negoti-
ate and monitor normative instruments — both 
treaties and soft instruments, such as recom-
mendations. The constitution of the WHO enun-
ciates the universal value of the right to health 
— a widely adopted international legal entitle-
ment.9,10
The WHO uses a variety of policy tools to set 
soft norms, with varying levels of institutional 
support. A World Health Assembly resolution 
expresses the will of 194 member countries. The 
Glossary
International Law
Treaty: A binding agreement between countries that is intended to create legal rights and duties. Treaties can often 
have substantial effects on private parties, such as corporations (e.g., trade law) and individuals (e.g., human rights).
Customary international law: Legal norms established by consistent practice among countries.
WHO Treaty-Making Powers
Convention: An international agreement under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, which empowers the World 
Health Assembly to “adopt conventions or agreements” by a two-thirds vote on “any matter within the compe-
tence of the Organization.” The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted in 2003) is the Assembly’s 
only convention.
Regulation: An international rule under Article 21, which empowers the World Health Assembly to adopt regulations 
on a range of health topics. The two Assembly regulations are the Nomenclature with Respect to Diseases and 
Causes of Death (adopted in 1948) and the International Health Regulations (revised in 2005).
WHO “Soft” Law
“Soft” law: An instrument that creates health norms without the binding nature of international law. Article 23 em-
powers the WHO to issue formal recommendations, but the organization has developed norms through a range 
of soft instruments, such as global strategies, action plans, and guidelines.
Recommendations: Norms under Article 23, which empowers the World Health Assembly “to make recommenda-
tions to members.” Two Assembly recommendations are the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes (adopted in 1981) and the Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health 
Personnel (adopted in 2010).
Global strategies: Proposals that offer a strategic vision of how to tackle health challenges, listing specific objectives 
and guidance to stakeholders — for example, the WHO Global Health Sector Strategy for HIV/AIDS, 2011–2015. 
Global strategies often stress the comparative advantages of the WHO, such as its ability to leverage its strengths 
through partnerships and coordination.
Global action plans: Proposals that outline specific steps or activities for a strategy to succeed — for example, the Global 
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, 2013–2020. Global plans  often specify 
detailed tasks, time horizons, and resources.
Guidelines: Policies or methods of professional practice that are approved by the Guidelines Review Committee 
and designed to promote evidence-based health policies or clinical interventions — for example, guidelines on 
patient safety.
International Human Rights Law
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: An agreement that requires governments to safeguard civil and 
 political rights, including the freedom of expression and religion, freedom from slavery and torture, and rights 
to privacy.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: An agreement that guarantees “the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” as well as capturing social 
determinants: “an adequate standard of living . . . including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions.”
General Comment 14: The interpretation of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the right to health, 
including health goods, services, and facilities that should be available, accessible, acceptable, and of good quality.
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agency has constitutional authority to adopt for-
mal recommendations; the two most prominent 
are the International Code of Marketing of 
Breast-Milk Substitutes (adopted in 1981)11 and 
the Global Code of Practice on the International 
Recruitment of Health Personnel (adopted in 
2010).12 The Assembly has also adopted influen-
tial global strategies and action plans.
The treaty-making powers of the WHO are 
extraordinary, with separate processes for nego-
tiating agreements, or conventions, and regula-
tions. Member countries must accept or reject a 
convention within 18 months after its adoption 
by the Assembly.10 This is a powerful mecha-
nism requiring countries to consider the treaty 
in accordance with national constitutional pro-
cesses. The WHO, however, lacks the authority 
to enforce compliance and thus relies on govern-
mental implementation through domestic law 
and policy.
The WHO can negotiate regulations on a 
range of health topics, including sanitation and 
quarantine, nomenclatures of diseases, and stan-
dards for the safety, purity, and potency of phar-
maceuticals. Regulations enter into force after 
adoption by the Assembly, except for members 
that notify the director-general within a speci-
fied time.10 Consequently, countries must pro-
actively opt out or they are automatically bound. 
The first WHO regulations — on nomenclature 
for diseases — date back to the late 19th cen-
tury as the International List of Causes of Death; 
these regulations are now implemented through 
the International Classification of Diseases.13
The second WHO regulations date back to 1892, 
when European countries adopted the Interna-
tional Sanitary Convention, a predecessor to the 
International Sanitary Regulations (now called 
the International Health Regulations).3
The constitution of the WHO creates ongoing 
governmental obligations to report annually on 
actions taken on recommendations, conventions, 
and regulations.10 Despite the normative powers 
of the WHO, modern international health law is 
remarkably thin, with only two major treaties 
adopted since the creation of the agency.
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
The WHO did not negotiate a convention until 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
WHO treaties: Conventions or Regulations WHO Nonbinding Normative Instruments
WHO Global Campaigns cosponsored with partnersHistorical predecessors to contemporary WHO instruments U.N. Nonbinding Resolutions and Declarations
1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
1892
Adoption of the International Sanitary 
Convention (predecessor to the 
International Health Regulations) 
1893
Adoption of the International List of 
Causes of Death (predecessor to the  
International Classification of Diseases)
1948
Adoption of Nomenclature 
with Respect to Diseases 
and Causes of Death 
1951
Adoption of the International Sanitary 
Regulations (predecessor to the 
International Health Regulations) 
1955
Launch of the global program to 
eradicate malaria
1959
Launch of the global program to 
eradicate smallpox 
1978
Adoption of the Declaration of Alma-Ata 
(“Health for All”) by the International 
Conference on Primary Health Care 
1981
Adoption of the 
International Code of 
Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes 
1988
Launch of the global 
program to eradicate polio  
1999
Launch of Vision 2020, a global 
initiative to eliminate avoidable 
blindness by the year 2020  
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Figure 1. Timeline of Major Milestones in Global Health Law.
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(FCTC), which was adopted in 2003.14 The FCTC, 
which remains the only convention adopted by 
the World Health Assembly, was ratified by 177 
countries that are home to 88% of the world’s 
population, although the convention was not 
ratified by 2 countries, the United States and In-
donesia, which have the third and fourth largest 
populations, respectively, worldwide.15 In 2012, 
the Secretariat of the FCTC estimated that nearly 
80% of the 159 countries that submitted reports 
had strengthened national tobacco-control laws 
after ratification.16 However, overall progress 
masks unequal performance — for example, 
China showed “an alarming lack of progress,” 
whereas India’s implementation was “slow.”16
The FCTC created binding norms to reduce 
the demand for, and supply of, tobacco products 
and to share information and resources. Efforts 
to reduce demand include taxing and pricing 
guided by health objectives, the provision of 
100% smoke-free environments, disclosures of 
contents and emissions of tobacco products, 
large warning labels on packaging of tobacco 
products, comprehensive marketing bans, and 
tobacco cessation and treatment programs. Re-
ducing the supply of tobacco focuses on illicit 
trade (e.g., smuggling and counterfeiting), which 
was estimated to account for 11.6% of global 
cigarette consumption in 2009, resulting in lost 
tax revenues of $30 to $50 billion per year.17
Despite the success of the FCTC in mobiliz-
ing governmental action and civil-society engage-
ment, the treaty has major weaknesses. First, it 
contains ambiguous language, affording coun-
tries broad discretion in implementation. Second, 
it does not provide resources to give low- and 
middle-income countries sufficient capacity to 
implement and enforce policies outlined in the 
convention. In addition, the tobacco industry has 
fought back against the FCTC, bringing cases 
under the World Trade Organization and invest-
ment treaties against Australia and Uruguay for 
their use of plain packaging of tobacco products 
and adoption of tobacco-control legislation — a 
classic conflict between health and commerce 
regimes.18,19
International Health Regulations
The World Health Assembly adopted a substan-
tially revised version of the International Health 
2000s 2010s
2000
Adoption of the Millennium 
Declaration and Millennium 
Development Goals   
2004
Adoption of the Global Strategy on 
Diet, Physical Activity, and Health    
2005
Adoption of the Revised 
International Health 
Regulations   
2006
Adoption of the Political 
Declaration on HIV/AIDS 
(5-yr follow-up) 
2006  
Launch of the Stop TB Strategy
2009
Adoption of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention 
and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 
2010
• Adoption of the Global Code of Practice on the International 
Recruitment of Health Personnel
• Adoption of the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol
2011
Launch of the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework
2011
• Adoption of the Political Declaration 
on the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases
• Adoption of the Political Declaration 
on HIV/AIDS (10-yr follow-up) 
2012
Adoption of a resolution promoting 
universal health coverage worldwide
2013
Launch of the Mental Health Action Plan
2014
Adoption of the Sustainable 
Development Goals 
2001
Publication of the Global 
Strategy for Containment of 
Antimicrobial Resistance 
2001 
Adoption of the Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
2003
Adoption of the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control
2003
Launch of the 3 by 5 Initiative (HIV 
treatment for 3 million patients by 2005) 
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Regulations in 2005 in the aftermath of the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, 
establishing a framework for global health secu-
rity.20 The aim of the regulations is to enhance 
the monitoring and reporting of international 
health threats and to improve the coordination 
of the response while avoiding unnecessary in-
terference with traffic and trade.21 The regula-
tions govern surveillance and containment of 
disease within countries, at borders, and in inter-
national travel.22
The regulations encompass a broad spec-
trum of health hazards of international con-
cern, regardless of their origin or source — bio-
logic, chemical, or radionuclear. Using a decision 
instrument as a guide, governments must moni-
tor health hazards and notify the WHO within 
24 hours after events that may constitute a pub-
lic health emergency of international concern. 
The director-general has the exclusive power to 
declare an emergency and has done so only once 
— during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. 
The regulations permit the WHO to take into ac-
count unofficial sources, such as nongovernmen-
tal organizations, scientists, and social networks 
in print and electronic media. Countries also 
agreed to develop core capacities — including 
legislation, national focal points, and pandemic 
planning — to implement the regulations.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
Framework
Although not a treaty, the WHO PIP Framework 
is an innovative hybrid — a soft law instrument 
that nonetheless can create binding obligations. 
Adopted in May 2011, the PIP Framework re-
solved the nearly 5-year controversy that erupted 
when Indonesia refused to share samples of in-
fluenza A (H5N1) virus with WHO collaborating 
centers. Claiming sovereignty over a virus that 
was identified in their territory, Indonesian offi-
cials expressed concern that their country would 
not receive a fair share of the benefits of scien-
tific discoveries.23,24
The PIP Framework facilitates sharing of in-
fluenza viruses that have human pandemic poten-
tial and increases access to vaccines and anti-
viral medications in developing countries. The 
agreement incorporates “standard material trans-
fer agreements” between the WHO and biotech-
nology companies or universities. When such 
agreements are signed, they create contractual 
duties to provide certain benefits in exchange 
for access to biologic materials. Recipients of 
such materials make monetary and in-kind com-
mitments, including commitments to donate vac-
cines to WHO stockpiles, offer products at af-
fordable prices, and make intellectual-property 
rights available. Sharing the benefits of scien-
tific progress is a vital aspect of global security 
and justice. However, the intellectual-property 
controversy associated with the novel corona-
virus that causes the Middle East respiratory syn-
drome (MERS) reminds the international com-
munity that the PIP Framework applies only to 
pandemic influenza, with no WHO-negotiated 
agreement covering other emerging diseases.25
In ter nationa l Hum a n  
R igh t s L aw
The constitution of the WHO proclaims, “The 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every 
human being.”10 Reflecting the same sentiment, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, which complements the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and which 161 countries have accepted as bind-
ing international law, guarantees “the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health.” It 
also spells out governmental obligations to re-
duce infant mortality, promote the development 
of healthy children, improve environmental and 
industrial hygiene, prevent and treat diseases, 
and ensure the provision of medical services.26 In 
a demonstration of the universal value of such 
provisions, all countries except South Sudan have 
joined at least one treaty recognizing the right to 
health.27
The right to health requires that governments 
meet “minimum core obligations,” including the 
provision of health facilities, goods, and services, 
without discrimination and distributed equita-
bly; nutritious and safe food; shelter, housing, 
sanitation, and safe and potable water; and es-
sential medicines. Health goods, services, and 
facilities must be available in sufficient quantity, 
with public accessibility, ethnic and cultural ac-
ceptability, and good quality, as outlined in 
General Comment 14 of the U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.28
Whether human rights law influences gov-
ernmental practices is disputed.29 However, health 
rights are incorporated into statutes and consti-
The New England Journal of Medicine 
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tutions in many countries and have formed the 
basis for landmark judicial rulings.3 The real-
world effect of human rights law depends on an 
active civil society, which can highlight govern-
mental violations, lobby parliaments, and litigate 
health rights.30 The most successful national 
litigation has involved access to essential medi-
cines. For example, in 2002, the Constitutional 
Court in South Africa struck down government 
limits on access to nevirapine for pregnant 
women with human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) infection. As a result of this ruling, the 
government had to begin to realize the rights of 
mothers and infants to HIV prevention.31
Judicial decisions are increasing access to 
underlying determinants of health, such as food, 
water, and housing. In 2001, the Indian Supreme 
Court held that nutrition programs were legal 
entitlements and required that cooked meals be 
provided for primary school children. In later 
orders, the court set timetables for action on 
subsidized grain, maternal and child health, 
and food for the homeless and rural poor.3 
Table 1 shows country-level court cases that il-
lustrate the effect of human rights law on health 
policy.
Ch a llenges in Gl ob a l  
He a lth L aw
Despite the potential of soft and hard instruments 
to set norms and mobilize multiple actors, global 
health laws have major limitations (Table 2). 
First, governments are loath to constrain them-
selves and, therefore, often reject international 
law or agree only to weak norms. Second, high-
income countries are reluctant to finance capac-
ity building in lower-income countries or to pro-
vide funding to the WHO without specific 
earmarks. And third, compliance mechanisms 
for such laws are often weak or nonexistent.
Because international law primarily addresses 
the rights and duties of countries, it cannot eas-
ily govern nonstate actors, which range from in-
dividuals and civil-society groups to foundations 
and private enterprises. Although newer global 
health institutions (e.g., UNAIDS, Global Fund, 
and GAVI Alliance) include civil-society repre-
sentatives on their governing boards, the WHO 
has resisted nonstate participation in its govern-
ing structures.32
The harmonization of governmental interests, 
moreover, can be difficult because of the dispa-
rate perspectives.33 Although high-income coun-
tries often favor trade liberalization, low- and 
middle-income countries seek greater access to 
drugs and the fruits of technological progress. 
In 2001, World Trade Organization members 
adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS (the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights) and Public Health, which 
allowed countries to issue a compulsory license 
during a public health emergency, granting to 
itself or a third party the right to produce or 
import a patented drug without authorization 
from the patent holder.34 So-called “TRIPS flex-
ibilities” were designed to ensure that intellec-
tual property should not prevent countries from 
providing affordable access to essential medica-
tions in a public health emergency.
Increasingly, the reconciliation of these inter-
ests occurs at the national level. For example, in 
2013, the Supreme Court of India held that No-
vartis did not have a valid patent in India on the 
lucrative cancer drug Gleevec.35 The court ruled 
that Indian law grants patents only to new com-
pounds and that modified drugs must improve 
treatment for patients. The decision could em-
bolden other emerging economies to reject sim-
ilar intellectual-property claims. At the same 
time, developed countries are seeking stricter 
intellectual-property protection in trade agree-
ments, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
which seeks to promote trade and investment 
among the partner countries.36
Trust in international organizations to act im-
partially and demonstrate leadership is crucial 
to the future of global health law. As new health 
security challenges arise, the integrity and effi-
cient functioning of the WHO becomes ever more 
important. The WHO, however, is struggling with 
a small group of donors that contribute approxi-
mately 80% of its total budget.37 The term for this 
type of financing is “multi-bi” aid — donors’ 
earmarking of noncore funding for specific sec-
tors, diseases, or regions through multilateral 
agencies.38 Since the leadership of the WHO is 
unable to control most of its budget, these aid 
arrangements endanger the perceived indepen-
dence and normative influence of the WHO.
Financing is intricately related to the challenge 
of building capacity to fulfill duties created by 
global health law. The 2011 review committee 
on the functioning of the International Health 
Regulations stressed that many countries lacked 
capacity and were not on a path to fulfill their 
The New England Journal of Medicine 
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obligations.39 The same failure to mobilize re-
sources has plagued WHO normative develop-
ment in such areas as achieving ambitious goals 
set forth in action plans on noncommunicable 
diseases and mental health.40-42
S tr ategy for Gl ob a l  
He a lth L aws
Given the undoubted need for global coopera-
tion, international norms are accepted as impor-
tant global health tools. The more difficult ques-
tion is whether to pursue hard or soft routes to 
address health challenges. This debate plays out 
in international forums ranging from alcohol con-
trol and biomedical research to broader reforms 
such as the Framework Convention on Global 
Health.30,43-45 However, there are strengths and 
weaknesses to both approaches.
Soft agreements are easier to negotiate, with 
countries more likely to accede to far-reaching 
norms if there is no formal obligation to comply. 
Table 1. Human Rights Court Cases Showing the Influence of International Law on Domestic Health Policy.
Case Year Country Basis for Decision Court Decision
Cruz del Valle Bermúdez v. 
Ministerio de Sanidad  
y Asistencia Social
1999 Venezuela Freedom from discrimination; rights 
to health, security, life, and the 
benefits of scientific progress
Requires government to cover treatment 
expenses for persons living with HIV 
and to develop information campaigns
People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
v. Union of India
2001 India Rights to health, food, and life Requires free and universal nutrition pro-
grams (midday meal), setting stan-
dards and timetables for action
Minister of Health v. Treatment 
Action Campaign
2002 South Africa Right to health Strikes down government limits on access 
to nevirapine for pregnant women
A.V. et al. v. Estado Nacional 2004 Argentina Rights to bodily integrity, health, 
and life
Mandates universal, free treatment for 
persons living with HIV
Roa Lopez v. Colombia 2006 Colombia Rights to life and health Finds unconstitutional a prohibition on 
abortions to protect the life or health 
of the mother or in cases of rape, even 
when the fetus is not viable
Judgment T-760/08 2008 Colombia Right to health Requires the government to unify two in-
surance plans with fewer benefits for 
indigent persons into a single plan 
with equal benefits for all
Lindiwe Mazibuko v. City  
of Johannesburg
2009 South Africa Rights to water and sanitation Finds no immediate duty to provide a spe-
cific amount of water but only reason-
able measures within the country’s 
 resources
Caceres Corrales v. Colombia 2010 Colombia Rights to life and heath Upholds a complete ban on tobacco ad-
vertising and sponsorship
Canada (Attorney General) v. 
PHS Community Services 
Society
2011 Canada Right to liberty and security of per-
son, right to life
Finds unconstitutional the failure to exempt 
drug users and staff at a supervised 
safe-injection site from bans on pos-
session of and trafficking in illicit drugs
Matsipane Mosetlhanyane et 
al. v. The Attorney General
2011 Botswana Freedom from torture and cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment; 
right to water and sanitation
Protects water rights of an indigenous 
community living in the Kalahari 
 desert
5000 Citizens v. Article 3 of Law 
No. 28705
2011 Peru Right to health Upholds a ban on smoking in all public 
places
British American Tobacco 
South Africa v. Minister of 
Health
2012 South Africa Freedom of expression; rights to 
information, a clean environ-
ment, and health
Upholds the constitutionality of restric-
tions on tobacco advertising and 
 marketing
Novartis AG v. Union of India 2013 India Rights to health and life Invalidates the patent for Gleevec because 
it was not materially better than the 
existing drug
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Countries can assent to a soft norm without the 
national constitutional processes entailed in rati-
fying a treaty. In addition, soft norms can be 
negotiated more quickly with the use of fewer 
resources. Resolutions of the WHO Health As-
sembly represent a major expression of political 
will and can lead to progressive deepening of 
norms — enacted into domestic law, referenced 
by treaty bodies, or incorporated into interna-
tional law. The WHO, moreover, is building ac-
countability mechanisms into soft agreements, 
with targets, monitoring, and timelines for com-
pliance.
However, national governments can largely 
ignore soft instruments, and as a result, civil 
society often urges treaty development.30 No hard 
norms have been enacted, for example, relating 
to food, alcohol, physical activity, injuries, pain 
medication, or mental health. If the WHO acts 
principally through voluntary agreements, while 
other sectors develop hard law, this weakens and 
sidelines the agency. Civil society often points to 
the obligatory nature of international trade law 
and its binding dispute-settlement mechanism, 
which often trumps WHO norms.46
Even with all the funding and celebrity power 
that has entered the global health space, key 
health indicators lag, whereas the health gap 
between rich and poor has barely abated.47,48 
A renewed attention to lawmaking efforts by the 
WHO and the human right to health are crucial 
elements of progress. It is only through law that 
individuals and populations can claim entitle-
ments to health services and that correspond-
ing governmental obligations can be established 
and enforced. It is through law that norms can 
be set, fragmented activities coordinated, and 
good governance ensured, including steward-
ship, transparency, participation, and account-
ability. Global health law, despite its limitations, 
remains vital to achieving global health with 
justice.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with 
the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
Table 2. Limitations of Global Health Law.
Challenge Description Example
National sovereignty Countries are reluctant to forgo self-governance or 
cede authority to  international actors.
The Global Code of Practice on the International Re-
cruitment of Health Personnel is voluntary, despite 
active recruitment from high-income countries.
Rise of nongovernmental actors Businesses, foundations, and civil- society groups 
have major effects on health but are hard to 
govern at the international level.
The Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and 
Health does not govern marketing of food.
Divergent interests of emerging 
economies and high-income 
countries
High-income countries defend trade liberalization 
(e.g., intellectual property), whereas low- and 
middle-income countries focus on health jus-
tice (e.g., access to medicines and fair alloca-
tion of scientific benefits).
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework 
struggled to reconcile Indonesia’s claim for fair 
sharing of benefits with the desire of high-income 
countries to receive viral samples.
Funding earmarked by private 
donors for specific sectors, 
diseases, or regions through 
multilateral agencies (“multi-
bi” financing)
Countries route assistance through the WHO and 
other multilateral agencies but hold tight control 
over its use, limiting WHO control of its resourc-
es and ability to set priorities and diminishing 
the perceived independence of the WHO.
Approximately 80% of the WHO’s funding is volun-
tary, with targets that are incongruent with the 
priorities of the World Health Assembly and the 
major causes of disability and death.
Funding for capacity building Global health law rarely requires high-income 
countries to build capacities in lower-income 
countries to fulfill international obligations.
A committee on functioning of the International 
Health Regulations (2011) found that many 
countries lacked capacity and could not fulfill 
their obligations.
Compliance and incentives WHO norms (whether soft or hard) rarely contain 
effective methods for holding countries and 
stakeholders accountable.
The Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alco hol 
does not require governmental action or prevent 
industry from lobbying against alcohol control.
Adjudication and enforcement  
of norms
The WHO lacks power to adjudicate most disputes 
and enforce norms.
The tobacco industry uses the World Trade Organi-
zation and investment treaties to challenge plain 
packaging of tobacco products and the initiation 
of tobacco-control campaigns.
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